Abstract. Michael Strevens [2001] has proposed an interesting and novel Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem (Q-D) problem (i.e., the problem of auxiliary hypotheses). Strevens's analysis involves the use of a simplifying idealization concerning the original Q-D problem. We will show that this idealization is far stronger than it might appear. Indeed, we argue that Strevens's idealization oversimplifies the Q-D problem, and we propose a diagnosis of the source(s) of the oversimplification.
this as providing a way to (at least, qualitatively) compare c(H, E) and c(A, E), where c(x, y) is a Bayesian measure of the degree to which y confirms (or supports) x. That is to say, we will examine the consequences of Strevens's approach with respect to the conditions under which c(H, E) ≥ c(A, E) in cases where H & A entails ¬E.
Strevens's Simplifying Idealization
The central element of Strevens's proposal is to simplify the original Q-D problem, by making use of the following idealization: (I) E is equivalent to ¬(H & A)
(I) asserts, not just that E entails that H and A aren't both true (as in the original Q-D problem), but also that E says no more than this. Strevens (p. 524 ) urges us to focus on the disconfirmation that E provides regarding H (vs A) "in virtue of and only in virtue of falsifying" H &A. He goes on to argue that (I) is not so strong as to oversimplify the problem from the perspective of Bayesian confirmation theory. We disagree. Below, we (i) describe some consequences of (I) that we think cast doubt on the legitimacy of Strevens's approach to Q-D, and (ii) offer a diagnosis of a possible source of the oversimplification implicit in Strevens's approach. Before getting into the details of the formal consequences of (I) in the context of Strevens's account, we begin with a cautionary remark. Bayesian readers should be rather suspicious when something like (I) is applied in this kind of context. Basically, the legitimacy of using (I) depends on whether logically weakening (or strengthening) the evidence in Q-D cases can have drastic confirmation-theoretic effects. There are many examples in the literature that illustrate the significant effects that can be caused by the logical weakening of evidence. In general, Bayesian confirmation is quite sensitive to such weakenings. That this is the case (in a general, abstract sense) has been known for some time (see Carnap [1950, §57] ). And, that there are important real examples of this phenomenon in statistical inference has also been known for quite a while. For instance, I.J. Good [1960] discusses the effect of evidential weakenings in connection with Hempel's ravens paradox (under the rubric of 'stoogian' evidence reports which ignore certain features of the data). As we will see below, it is this very phenomenon that underlies the problems with Strevens's use of (I) in this context.
Indications that (I) Oversimplifies Q-D
For the most part, Strevens speaks about the posterior probabilities of H and A (on evidence E) in his discussion of the relative degrees of confirmation E provides for H vs A. However, Strevens sometimes (e.g., p. 526) uses the Bayesian ratio measure of the degree to which y incrementally confirms x: r(x, y) = Pr(x | y) Pr(x) . This measure of confirmation (or something ordinally equivalent to it) has been defended by various Bayesians (e.g., Peter Milne [1996] ). While we think this measure and the posterior probability measure of degree of confirmation are both inadequate (see Eells and Fitelson [2002] and Fitelson [2002] for several arguments against r), we will not (for now) criticize Strevens on these grounds. What's most important here is how Strevens uses his idealization (I) to simplify the expressions c(H, E) and c(A, E) (for whichever Bayesian measure of confirmation c you prefer). As it turns out, (I) is much more powerful in this respect than Strevens's discussion seems to suggest. Strevens argues that (I) does not oversimplify the comparison of c(H, E) and c(A, E). In particular, Strevens suggests that -even if we assume (I) -the comparative relationship between c(H, E) and c(A, E) will depend not only on the prior probabilities of H and A, but also on various conditional probabilities such as Pr(A | H) and Pr(H | A) (see Strevens's plots and discussion on pages 526-527). The proof of the following theorem shows that this is not the case, for any of the Bayesian measures of confirmation that we have seen in recent use, including the posterior probability measure, and all contemporary incremental measures, including r. That is, enforcing (I) reduces the comparison of c(H, E) and c(A, E) to a simple comparison of the priors Pr(H) and Pr(A), which renders the evidence E irrelevant (a posteriori) to this comparison.
3 It seems clear to us that, in the original Q-D problem, the mere relationship between the priors of H and A should not by itself determine the relative support that E provides for H vs A. We take Quine and Duhem to be asking the following question: In cases where H & A entails ¬E, can the evidence E differentially confirm H vs A -a posteriori -and, if so, how? This is not a question about the relative a priori plausibilities of H vs A, but rather a question about the a posteriori confirmational power of E to discriminate between H and A when H & A entails ¬E. What Theorem 1 shows is that Strevens's assumption (I) makes it impossible to use Bayesianism to provide an affirmative answer to this question (or to provide an explanation of how an affirmative answer is possible). Pace Strevens, we think an affirmative answer to the Q-D question is possible within a Bayesian framework, and we take this ability of Bayesianism (to do what deductive accounts of confirmation cannot seem to do) to be a virtue. Here is a simple example that makes our worry about (I) vivid.
Consider a lottery involving 11 tickets. Let H be the claim that either the winning ticket will be among tickets #1-#5 or it will be ticket #11. Let A be the claim that the winning ticket will be among tickets #4-#9, and let E be the claim that either the winning ticket is among tickets #1-#3 or it is among tickets #6-#9. It seems to us intuitively clear that E favors A over H in this example, since c(A, E) > c(H, E), for any Bayesian measure of confirmation c, including the posterior probability measure and all incremental measures. Moreover, this is a Q-D case, in which H & A entails ¬E, Pr(A) = Pr(H), E confirms A 4 (in the incremental sense), and E disconfirms H.
So, H and A have equal a priori probability, but E confirms A more strongly than E confirms H. We take it that this example suffices to show that Bayesianism is capable of answering the Q-D question in the affirmative, and explaining how an affirmative answer is possible. Unfortunately, because it assumes (I), Strevens's account cannot do so. The problem here is that if we look only at the part of E that is equivalent to ¬(H & A), we cannot explain why E favors A over H in this example (or others like it), since to do so would require an appeal to A's having greater a priori plausibility than H. But, A doesn't have greater a priori plausibility than H here, so no explanation based on Strevens's (I) is forthcoming. Our example suggests that (I) oversimplifies the original Q-D problem. But, the more general point is that to look only at the part of E that falsifies H & A (as Strevens recommends) is to ignore precisely that part of E that would allow a Bayesian to answer the challenge of Quine and Duhem. In general, probabilistic approaches to confirmation work best when they take account of the totality of the evidence, and not some censored version of it. What Strevens's paper makes clear is that taking into account the full content of E [i.e., not ignoring the part of E that goes beyond ¬(H & A)] is essential to resolving the Q-D problem within a probabilistic framework.
Strevens's Argument for the Legitimacy of (I)
Our discussion so far suggests that (I) is too strong a 'simplifying idealization' to yield a useful general Bayesian rendition and analysis of the original Q-D problem. But, these considerations do not furnish a diagnosis of the source of the problem in the development and justification of the account. Strevens presents an argument, which is supposed to show that (I) is not an undue oversimplification of the Q-D problem. First, Strevens returns to the original Q-D problem, in which E ¬(H &A), but ¬(H &A) E (i.e., in which (I) is relaxed). Then, he aims (i) to identify a condition C under which the "partial posterior" Pr(H | ¬ (H & A) ) is approximately equal to the "full posterior" Pr(H | E), and then (ii) to argue that this condition C obtains in the "interesting" Q-D cases. Here's a concise exposition of Strevens's strategy for justifying idealization (I).
Assume (as in the original Q-D problem) only that E ¬(H & A).

∴ Pr(H | ¬(H &
A)) = Pr(H | E) iff Pr(E | H & ¬A) = Pr(E | ¬(H & A)). 3. ∴ Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) ≈ Pr(H | E) if Pr(E | H & ¬A) ≈ Pr(E | ¬(H & A)). 4. Pr(E | H & ¬A) ≈ Pr(E | ¬(H & A)) in all "interesting" Q-D cases.
∴ Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) ≈ Pr(H | E) in all "interesting" Q-D cases.
∴ It is legitimate to make use of (I) in a Bayesian account of Q-D.
The basic idea here is to establish that Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) ≈ Pr(H | E) holds in all "interesting" Q-D cases, and as a result, that there is no real harm in the idealization that E is no stronger than ¬(H & A), since this won't radically (or unfairly) affect our judgments concerning the posterior probability of H (and, presumably, by symmetry, the same should hold for A), at least, not in the "interesting" or "important" Q-D cases (e.g., cases in which Strevens's so-called "Newstein Effects" are absent).
We think there are various ways this argument goes wrong. Specifically, we think that premises (3), (4), and (5) of the above argument are all false, and that the ∴'s which precede (3), (5), and (6) are fallacious. We will not discuss the problems with premise (4) presently (these problems, which involve Strevens's discussion of what he calls "Newstein Effects", are rather subtle and would require more space to flesh out). Our focus will be on steps (3) and (6), which are fallacious. As for the rest of the argument, premises (1) and (2) are beyond reproach. (2) is a theorem (given assumption (1)), and (1) is a basic assumption of Q-D. The following theorem exposes what we take to be one of two key missteps in the above argument [in the step from (2) to (3)]:
Theorem 2. Assuming E ¬(H & A), it is possible for Pr(E | H &¬A) and Pr(E | ¬(H & A)) to be arbitrarily close, while at the same time Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) and Pr(H | E) are arbitrarily far apart [despite the fact that "Pr(H | ¬(H &
A)) = Pr(H | E) iff Pr(E | H & ¬A) = Pr(E | ¬(H & A))"
does follow from E ¬(H & A), as Strevens shows].
What this shows is that despite the fact that (2) is a theorem (assuming (1)), (3) So, the claim that the "partial" and "full" posteriors can be assumed to be "close" in the "interesting" Q-D cases, because the likelihoods in question are "close" in such cases is false (no matter how liberally we interpret "≈").
The second misstep in the above argument is the step from (5) to (6). Premise (5) is relevant to the confirmational comparison c(H, E) ≥ c(A, E) if one assumes that the posterior probability is an adequate Bayesian measure of degree of confirmation. But, contemporary Bayesians think of confirmation in terms of degree of probabilistic relevance, not in terms of degree of conditional probability. As such, contemporary Bayesians use relevance measures of confirmation that disagree radically with the posterior probability when it comes to comparative claims like c(H, E) ≥ c(A, E). Various relevance measures have been proposed and defended in the literature on confirmation theory (see Fitelson [1999] for a brief survey). Some of these measures will sanction the step from (5) to (6) in Q-D cases, and some will not. The measure we favor is the likelihood ratio measure l(H, E) =
Pr(E | H)
Pr(E | ¬H) . See Fitelson [2001] for various reasons to favor this measure over other relevance measures. As it turns out, even if (5) 
is true (in a Q-D case), it does not follow that l(H, ¬(H & A)) ≈ l(H, E).
6 We think this makes the step from (5) to (6) fallacious (at least, in the absence of reasons not to use relevance measures of confirmation, like l or r) from the point of view of contemporary Bayesian confirmation theory. To wit:
Theorem 3. Assuming E ¬(H & A), it is possible for Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) and Pr(H | E) to be arbitrarily close, while at the same time l(H, ¬(H & A)) and l(H, E) are arbitrarily far apart (where l(H, E) =
Pr(E | H)
Pr(E | ¬H) is the likelihood ratio measure of the degree to which E incrementally confirms H).
We think that further analysis will reveal other problems with Strevens's strategy for justifying his use of (I) (e.g., concerning his premise (4)). But, those worries would require a separate paper to articulate properly. So, we now conclude our discussion.
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Thanks to Alan Hájek, Jim Hawthorne, Jim Joyce, Elliott Sober, Michael Strevens, and an anonymous referee of this journal for useful comments and suggestions. Proof. We will prove this theorem with a combination of algebraic and axiomatic technique. All we need is a 2-event probability space, containing the events H and A. Then, we have four elementary probabilities in the space, each of which is on [0, 1], and the sum of which is 1. These four elementary probabilities are as follows:
Branden Fitelson
Now, the proof for the ratio measure r proceeds as follows.
Therefore, by (I), Pr(H) ≥ Pr(A) ⇔ r(H, E) ≥ r(A, E). We omit the (similar) proofs for the other Bayesian measures of confirmation currently being used and defended, e.g., the posterior probability measure p(x, y) = Pr(x | y), the difference measure d(x, y) = Pr(x | y) − Pr(x), the likelihood ratio measure l(x, y) =
Pr(y | x)
Pr(y | ¬x) , and the normalized difference measure s(x, y) = Pr(x | y) − Pr(x | ¬y). See Fitelson [1999] 
Proof. We prove this theorem by describing an algorithm for generating probability models in which
There are many ways to do this. Any one of these would be sufficient to establish the theorem. Here is the first such algorithm we found. 8 We need an algorithm for generating a 3-event probability model, containing the events H, A, and E, such that (i)-(iii) above are all satisfied. Such models will have eight elementary probabilities, each of which is on [0, 1], and the sum of which is 1. Our algorithm is as follows.
9
Step 1. Pick an ∈ (0, 1 2 ), which is as small as you like.
Step 2. Assign the following numbers to the eight elementary probabilities in the space:
This procedure will always generate a probability model in which (i)-(iii) obtain. 10 u
Theorem 3. Assuming E ¬(H & A), it is possible for Pr(H | ¬(H & A)) and Pr(H | E) to be arbitrarily close, while at the same time l(H, ¬(H & A)) and l(H, E) are arbitrarily far apart (where l(H, E) =
Pr(E | H)
Pr(E | ¬H) is the likelihood ratio measure of the degree to which E incrementally confirms H).
Proof. We prove this theorem by describing an algorithm for generating probability models in which ( (H & A) ). The algorithm is as follows:
Step 1. Pick an ∈ (0, This procedure will always generate a probability model in which (iv)-(vi) obtain.
11
That is sufficient to establish the theorem, and to complete the A. u
